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The Corporate Monster Metaphor
Abstract
The metaphor of corporations as monsters is a feature of academic and judicial writings. Like monsters,
corporations are creatures of fiction that problematize and challenge order. Corporations do not fit neatly
into common law criminal legal doctrine, which was conceived and structured around the classic legal
subject, that is, the individual human being. Corporations are amoral immortals, which ‘have no
conscience and feel no pain’. They have superhuman strength, growing exponentially in size and wealth in
accordance with the dictates of capitalism, and are capable of doing great harms and evil. Like monsters,
corporations are contaminated and contaminating; in the process of becoming legal subjects
corporations have become dehumanised and dehumanising. Despite the dominance of the corporate
monster metaphor, there is slippage around the conception of which type of monster best represents
corporations, and this slippage has implications for how the law regards and regulates (or not)
corporations. This article takes the metaphor of the corporation as monster seriously. Descriptively, this
analysis asks us to think more specifically about the different metaphorical implications of different kinds
of monsters. Normatively, the argument considers the implications of these distinctive framings for
criminal legal understandings of the corporation. Calling corporations monsters places us within the
horror genre. We therefore need to read and understand these metaphors within that genre. A central
insight of the horror genre is that monsters justify and require extreme responses. Rather than stopping at
the argument that corporations have no body to kick, we need to find more imaginative and specific
responses to corporate crime.
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The Corporate Monster Metaphor
Penny Crofts1
1 Introduction
There has been a great deal of judicial and academic reliance upon, and
analysis of, the metaphor of the corporation as a person (Iwai, 1999;
Pollman, 2011; Wright, 2015). The personification metaphor has been
a dominant way of conceptualising and anchoring the disembodied
corporation in order to ascribe to it legal rights and responsibilities.2
The recognition of corporations as organisational entities with rights
and responsibilities by endowing them with ‘legal personality’ is not
controversial (Orts, 2013: 2). After all, the granting of legal personality
is a constitutive role of law (Deakin et al., 2017). Difficulties arise rather
because criminal legal doctrine has been constructed around the ‘ideal
legal actor’ (Naffine, 2009: 67), the responsible human being.3 To state
the obvious, there are, however, vast differences between corporations
and people. Corporations do not fit neatly into pre-existing criminal
legal categories that were constructed around the classic legal subject.
There are difficulties in establishing fundamental elements of criminal
offences – the mens rea, actus reus and temporal coincidence. This
results in awkward efforts to either anthropomorphize corporations
to slot into pre-existing legal doctrine (such as the directing mind
doctrine discussed below), or to undermine it, the better to reflect the
reality of corporate existence (such as the reversal of the burden of
proof and/or assumptions of fault (Braithwaite, 2001; Crofts, 2020a)).
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This in turn raises disturbing questions about what precisely is required
to establish the blameworthiness of a legal subject. Corporations
transgress cherished criminal legal categories constructed around the
paradigmatic legal subject, that is, they disrupt, collapse or threaten the
taxonomic logics and distinctions of criminal law.

These transgressions have contributed to an accompanying metaphor
of the corporation as monster.4 A key attribute of monsters is that they
transgress cherished categories and boundaries – for example, vampires
and zombies are both/neither living and/or dead. The monster ‘undoes
our understanding of the way things are and violates our sense of how
they should be’ (Weinstock, 2013: 2). Foucault offers a quasi-juridical
framing of monsters (Shildrick, 2005), asserting that the production
of monsters should be understood as a breach of nature and law; they
‘combine the impossible and the forbidden’ (2003:64-65). The hybrid is
monstrous ‘only because it is also a legal labyrinth, both transgression
and undecidability at the level of the law… the monster is a juridicalnatural complex’ (Foucault, 2003: 65). On this account, the irregularity
of monsters calls law into question, challenging its limits and legitimacy,
resulting in anxiety.

Criminal legal narratives produce corporations as monsters—
artificial, strange and foreign, both/neither the same as and/or different
from the classic legal subject. In addition, corporations have other
characteristics of monsters. Corporations are ‘not natural living persons,
but artificial beings, corpora ficta’ (Wormser, 1931: v-vi) . They have
superhuman strength, growing exponentially in size and wealth. They
are capable of doing evil (Louis K Liggett Co et al v Lee, Comptroller
et al: 567). They can live forever. As a consequence, monstrous
metaphors of corporations abound in legal and academic writing,
comparing corporations with Frankenstein’s monster (Bakan, 2004;
Chen and Hanson, 2004; Gabaldon, 1992; Peters, 2017; Thoennes,
2004; Wormser, 1931), Godzilla (Duruigbo, 2004: 33), aliens (Crofts,
2022; French, 1995), hydra (Barkan, 2013: 54–55), and ‘wormes in the
entrayles’ of the body politic (Hobbes, 1651: 230).
This article takes the metaphor of the corporation as monster
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seriously. Metaphors have traditionally been viewed and defined as
decorative, figurative use of language in which one thing is described
in terms of another. However, this is an inadequate account of the
broader and more significant role of metaphor. In Metaphors we live
by, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that metaphors shape not just
our communications but also how we relate to the world, what we
perceive, and how we get around. Yet we may be unaware of the role
they play in defining our everyday realities (Lakoff and Johnson,
1980: 30). Lakoff and Johnson use the example of the metaphoric
conception of ‘argument is war’. They argue that this structures what
we do and how we understand what we are doing when we argue – for
example, we defend a position, win or lose, shoot someone down, or
destroy an opponent. Lakoff and Johnson suggest that we imagine an
alternative metaphor, such as, ‘argument is dancing’, with the idea that
a different metaphor might work differently. Many legal theorists have
drawn upon these ideas to identify metaphor in law and think through
their implications.5 Pierre Schlag argues in favour of a closer analysis
of metaphorical legal structures because the ‘aesthetic structures or
our own legal thinking are far less coherent, far less stable, and far
less advanced than we legal thinkers typically represent them to be’
(Schlag, 1990: 810).

I draw upon these insights about the power and inconsistencies
of metaphors to analyse the corporation as monster. I unpick the
metaphor and its underlying assumptions in order to elaborate the
legal conceptualisation of the corporation in detail. The metaphor
highlights some aspects of the legal conceptualisation of corporations
whilst hiding others (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 61). Descriptively,
this analysis asks us to think more specifically about the different
metaphorical implications of different kinds of monsters. Normatively,
the argument considers the implications of these distinctive framings
for criminal legal understandings of the corporation. This approach is
inspired by Lakoff and Johnson’s proposal of the alternative metaphor
of ‘argument is dancing’. This metaphor is ostensibly enchanting but on
closer examination it raises new questions. There are many different
ways of dancing which have implications for how the metaphor works.
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Ballroom dancing, for example, assumes a male leader and a female
follower, entrenching heteronormative and sexist paradigms. Tango
implies a more sensual and a less formal mode of discourse.

The monster metaphor tends to be drawn upon as a form of critique
of corporations and/or corporate law. But this article argues that we
can take the corporate monster metaphor seiously. Calling corporations
monsters places us within the horror genre. We therefore need to read
and understand these metaphors within that genre. A central insight of
the horror genre is that monsters justify and require extreme responses.
Rather than stopping at the argument that corporations have no body
to kick, we need to find more imaginative and specific responses
to corporate crime. Additionally, part of the threat and promise of
monsters is that in challenging fundamental categories they enable
and require change. It may be possible to rewrite the corporation so
that it is not so monstrous in its pursuits, or to rewrite legal categories
so that corporations are no longer categorized and conceptualized as
transgressive monsters.
In the following section, I consider specific corporate monster
metaphors and analyse their implications in terms of criminal law and
corporate responsibility. I detail the prevalent trope of each monster
metaphor but draw upon the horror genre to articulates aspects of
the monster metaphor that are inconsistent with or challenge legal
assumptions. I conclude by considering the insights and implications
of the horror genre for legal conceptualisations and responses to
corporate culpability.
2 Which Corporate Monster?
Despite the prevalence of the corporate monster metaphor, different
monsters have very different implications in terms of how the law
constructs the legal subject and the legal responses available to it. Each
metaphor operates in a subtly different way, enabling and obscuring
our understanding.
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A Frankenstein’s Creature/Monster
The most common contemporary conceptualisation of the corporation
as a specific monster is that of Frankenstein’s creature (Bakan, 2004;
Chen and Hanson, 2004; Gabaldon, 1992; Peters, 2017; Thoennes,
2004; Wormser, 1931).6 The metaphor is based on the novel by Mary
Shelley (and countless film and play adaptations), in which a creature is
created by Victor Frankenstein who then turns on its creator.7 The story
of Frankenstein’s creature is one of human invention and ingenuity, but
also a cautionary tale (Dorf, 2012).
The Frankenstein monster metaphor is commonly applied explicitly
or implicitly in legal analysis of corporations.8 Like Frankenstein’s
monster, corporations are uncannily made up of an amalgam of
individuals. The idea is reinforced in the etymology of corporation as ‘a
body of persons’ (Hoad, 2003). The conceptualisation of the corporation
as an amalgam of bodies predated Frankenstein:
That a corporation is an artificial body composed of divers constituent
members ad in star corporis humani [within or near the likeness or
image of a human body] and that the ligaments of this body politick
or artificial body are the franchises and liberties thereof, which bind
and unite all its members together, and the whole frame and essence
of the corporation therein (Sir James Smith’s Case, 730).

Frankenstein’s creature is particularly appropriate for the dominant
approach for ascribing corporate liability in the United Kingdom and
Australia, that of identification theory, which holds a company liable
only when a director or senior officer has acted with the requisite
fault, expounded in Tesco v Nattrass and finessed by Meridian Global
Funds.9 The ‘state of mind’ of the directing mind of those invested by
proper authority with managerial powers and responsibility are treated
by law as that of the organisation. This principle permits criminal
liability to be imposed on a corporation for an offence that requires
mens rea. Identification theory requires that any successful prosecution
of a corporation needs to demonstrate that the controlling mind or
brain of the corporation (usually the board of directors) was aware of
the criminality of its actions and possessed the necessary mens rea. A
77

Penny Crofts

major difficulty of the directing mind doctrine is ‘determining who
the directing mind is and whether she controls what the organisation
does’ (Campbell, 2018: 58). In the case of Frankenstein’s monster it is
straightforward – although made up of (parts of ) multiple people the
creature is controlled by a single brain. The metaphor seeks to grapple
with group agency and the granting of rights to an artificial body, but
the metaphor is overly simplistic because Frankenstein’s monster is an
amalgam of body parts, rather than individuals, so unlike corporations,
there is only one brain, and problems of who intended what do not
arise.
The Frankenstein’s monster metaphor works almost too well in
confirming identification theory. It does not, however, reflect the
proliferation of corporations, nor their increasing complexity and size.
Although Frankenstein’s monster is freakishly large, an essential plot
line is that he is on his own. Frankenstein’s monster metaphor veils the
difficulties and shortcomings of identification theory by confirming
and reflecting the model of the individual legal subject – one mind
controlling one body. Judicial use of the metaphor does not extend this
far but given the proliferation of corporations it is as though Victor
made another creature, they bred, and the world is now populated
with Frankensteinian corporate monsters. Even this extension of the
metaphor does not capture the difficulties of identifying a single mind
controlling complex and separate bodies and actions.
B Zombies
Zombies have some similarities with Frankenstein’s monster (they
are both back from the dead), but they have very different historical
precedents (Christie and Lauro, 2011; Crofts and Vogl, 2019). In the
horror genre, zombies are frequently depicted as a critique of capitalism
and rampant consumption (Wood, 1980). In recent years, however, and
particularly following the GFC, as Chris Reitz elaborates elsewhere in
this volume, the ‘zombie corporation’ expresses the idea that businesses
are operating while effectively dead but are buttressed by governmental
supports and bailouts. This metaphor draws upon and emphasises the
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attribute of zombies as the living dead (Datta, 2018; Harman, 2010).10
The metaphor has been extended to zombie capitalism: ‘legions of
‘living-dead’ firms and households [are] so indebted they are unlikely
to ever become solvent’ (Datta, 2018: 87). Indebted socioeconomic
entities which would normally be left to die (insolvent, liquidated) are
given a second undead life (Datta, 2018: 89).

Frankenstein’s monster primarily kills or maims. In contrast,
zombies (and the other monsters considered below) contaminate
and are contaminated (Douglas, 2002). They pollute those that they
come in contact with. If a person is bitten by a zombie they become a
zombie.11 In terms of the zombie corporation metaphor, those who are
unfortunate enough to trade with an insolvent corporation will suffer
loss and may themselves be tainted. The concept of zombie corporations
is based on an implicit assumption that these living-dead corporations
are exceptional and that state intervention is due to emergency or
necessity. This confirms the misleading belief in a ‘free market’ and
fails to illuminate the extent to which corporations require and are
provided with state support across time and place (Farnsworth, 2013;
Tombs and Whyte, 2014).

The metaphor of the zombie corporation deploys only one aspect of
zombies – the living-dead. However, a further attribute of zombies lies
in their monomania. Zombies, like for-profit corporations, are created
and constructed to want only one thing (brains or profit) (Friedman,
1970). Zombies thus provide an over-the-top apocalyptic depiction of
the worst harms of corporations, obsessively profit-seeking with no
concern for the harms that they are inflicting in the pursuit of their
goal. Zombies have a common goal to eat brains, however; unlike the
employees and management of a corporation, they do not work as a
collective.12 Zombies remain as separate individuals and are not under
the command of one mind as required by identification theory. This
is an extreme example of the theory of corporate nominalism. That is,
that corporations do not have a separate identity over and above the
individuals that comprise it (Iwai, 1999).
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C Vampires
In contrast, vampires are frequently depicted as working as a collective,
albeit a fractured, bickering collective. Like Frankenstein’s creature,
vampires are creatures of the industrial revolution. Much of our modern
understanding of vampires draws from Bram Stoker (1897), but
Stoker was not the first author to write about them (e.g. Goethe, 1797;
Polidori, 1819). Thirty years earlier, Marx had already recast capitalism
as a form of economic vampirism. In Das Kapital (1867/2008: 149)
he described capital as ‘dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by
sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks.’
This vampire metaphor was more than just a rhetorical device but
was fundamental to Marx’s conception of capitalism as founded on
dead labour (Neocleous, 2003). Corporations are still described as
bloodsuckers—rapacious, insatiable, and corrupt (Sutherland, 2006:
150). The vampire metaphor expresses the idea of corporations that
are so avid in their pursuit of profit that they do not care what harm
they inflict – this is commonly expressed as putting money before
people.13 But the metaphor of the corporate vampire implies that such
an approach is exceptional and monstrous. This is incorrect – wealth
maximisation is the default norm in public-traded companies (Page
and Katz, 2010).
An underlying resonance of the corporate vampire metaphor is that
corporations, like vampires, have ‘no soul to damn’ (Coffee Jr, 1980).
They ‘have no conscience and feel no pain’ (Thoennes, 2004: 204).
Vampire stories like True Blood and Twilight emphasise the ‘otherness’ of
vampires, with distinct cultures and norms. Like vampires, corporations
are made up of humans, but in the process of incorporation they have
lost their human values (Goforth, 2010). Indeed, legal principles uphold
and require the dehumanisation of those involved with corporations.
For example, the principle of limited liability for shareholders means
that investors can only lose the capital that they choose to invest. If the
company incurs losses greater than the value of the sum invested, its
shareholders bear no further responsibility for this loss. Accordingly,
there is no legal requirement for investors to care about harms caused by
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the corporation in its quest for profit (Bakan, 2004). Similar arguments
have been made about the contaminating dehumanising effects of the
corporate form on employees (Gobert and Punch, 2003: 17-18). We
act differently at/for work than we do at home. We might step up and
intervene as a private individual, but at work we have clearly delineated
roles within a specific organisational culture.

Vampires must drink blood, and though perverse, this is a
comprehensible motive. They are frequently portrayed as distracted,
flawed, and bickering.14 Unlike zombies, they blend into and reflect
the cultures, values, and desires of the world they inhabit. Accordingly,
vampires tend to retain a common goal – blood – but they can work
against each other. The metaphor may thus reflect the ways in which
departments in large corporations may act against each other whilst
simultaneously aiming to achieve a common goal.

The vampire metaphor ref lects the longevity of corporations.
Both vampires and corporations are arguably amoral immortals
(McCutcheon, 2011: 731). The metaphor highlights the ongoing
existence of corporations. Despite corporations cycling through
employees and management across time, the identity of the corporation
remains the same. Thus, claims by employees and members of a Board
that not only did they not personally cause past wrongs, they did
not know about them, should not be an argument against corporate
responsibility.15 But what of the situation where the corporation or
vampire has a change of heart? For example, the character Angel in
Buffy the Vampire Slayer regained his soul and as a consequence wished
to atone for past wrongs. The immortality of vampires and corporations
raises questions about responsibility for past harms, particularly where
the corporation has tried to ensure such harms do not recur and to
provide compensation for past wrongs (Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993).
Despite their potential immortality, vampires are actually
surprisingly vulnerable – they must sleep in their coffins, sunshine can
destroy them. They are afraid of silver crosses and garlic. Likewise,
although we tend to think of corporations as robust, corporations are
surprisingly vulnerable. They appear to require continuing high levels

81

Penny Crofts

of government (and community) support to ‘survive’, to the extent that
Farnsworth has argued that there should be a concept of ‘corporate
welfare’ (Farnsworth, 2013). As the living dead, both zombies and
vampires cannot be killed. They can only be resolved with extraordinary
measures specific to each monster. Unlike zombies, according to (some
portrayals of) vampire lore if the head vampire is resolved (with a stake
through the heart) – all other vampires are resolved.16 This reflects an
assumption of the common law principle of the directing mind, that
identifying and punishing or removing the culpable directing mind
will result in complete change throughout the corporation.

The vampire metaphor also highlights the dangerous attraction of
corporations. Unlike Frankenstein’s creature and zombies,17 vampires
are depicted as seductive and glamourous. This reflects Tombs and
Whyte’s (2014) use of the concept of the synoptic, that is, viewer
society. The synopticon disciplines us into a particular way of thinking
about power when we watch the powerful (Tombs and Whyte, 2014:
2–3). Despite awareness of widescale harms inflicted by corporations,
the corporation and its brands are ever-present and the focus of our
attention and desires. Seduced by the capitalist’s spell we suffer a “loss
of self ” and emerge as little more than a walking corpse (Morrissette,
2019). The seductive spell of the vampire produces zombies in us.
D Alien invaders
The idea of corporations as aliens was explored by the corporate
ethicist Peter French (1995) to make his argument that corporations
be regarded as moral entities of a different kind. Like the fictional
aliens in War of the Worlds, he argued, corporations have taken over the
world, stating ‘[t]he world has been radically changed but the requisite
morality to deal with those changes has not been worked out’ (1995: 3).
These insights can be made in relation to the failure of legal doctrine to
adapt to the corporate invaders (Crofts, 2021).
The original film in the Alien franchise (of the same name) had
only one alien. The sequel, Aliens (1986) directed by James Cameron,
has multiple aliens of the same species, which provides a means to tease
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out our ways of thinking about corporate criminal responsibility. In
Aliens, it is difficult to ascertain the directing mind of the aliens. There
are many different aliens at different levels of development and none of
them are represented as communicating in a way that is comprehensible
to the characters or the audience. The audience (and Ripley) assume that
the directing mind is the Queen – she is the biggest, appears capable
of making a deal with Ripley (e.g. I won’t kill your offspring if you
don’t kill mine) and much of the activity of the other aliens is directed
towards protecting her. But it is never made clear if she is in charge of
all operations, or solely in terms of reproduction. It is apparent however
that all the aliens are working together towards a common goal.
The corporations as aliens metaphor suggests an alternative to the
nominalist approach which regards corporations as nothing more than
collectives of individuals. In contrast, the so-called ‘realist’ approach
attempts to grapple with the corporation as a legal agent in and of itself.
According to this perspective, corporations can act and be at fault in
ways that are different from that of its constituent members (Campbell,
2018; Colvin and Argent, 2016; Field and Jorg, 1991; Woolf, 1997).
This perspective asserts that corporations are more than just the sum
of their parts (Dan-Cohen, 2016; Kim, 2000). It is informed by
studies that suggest that organisations, like other collective bodies,
often develop an identity independent of and transcending the specific
individuals who control or work within them.18

A key argument against realist approaches in criminal law is that it
is farcical to suggest that a corporation can have any intention which
is separate from the human beings that make up the corporation. This
argument is consistent with a key (assumed) characteristic of monsters,
that is, that monsters are beyond human comprehension. It is this very
inability to explain monsters that leads to the concept of monstrous
wickedness (Cole, 2006; Crofts, 2012). But even in Aliens, motivation
and action comes across as knowable and comprehensible. It feels
inappropriate to apply realist corporate criminal law concepts to the
aliens because they are so strange and foreign. However, although, alien
communications are never portrayed in the film and we can assume
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that we would not be able to understand them anyway, it is clear that
they are working together toward the specific goals of the survival
and reproduction of the species. Unlike Alien, which featured only
one alien, Aliens portrays innumerable species at various stages of life
development, sizes and function. Nevertheless, they are understood
throughout the film as capable of common intentions, joint actions and
shared goals. If we apply this insight to corporations, it suggests that
rather than complicated methods of attributing criminal responsibility
such as by identifying the ‘directing mind’ and figuring our its mens
rea, we might be better placed to look at how the corporate state of
mind is manifested in its systemis, policies and patterns of behaviour
(Bant 2021).
3 Responding to horror
By taking the metaphor of corporate monsters seriously, this article has
demonstrated that the metaphor can yield insights and critique into
legal conceptualisations of the corporation. A feature shared by all the
monsters explored in this article is that they cause, each in their own
way, widespread and systemic harm. A further common feature is that
these harms are consistent and comprehensible. Although one theory
of monsters suggests that they represent pure malevolence, wishing
only to harm,19 this article has highlighted a third feature of monsters,
that is, that they inflict this harm for instrumental reasons. Suffering
is not the goal of the act, just a necessary means towards achieving
something else (Cole, 2006: 16-17). The same arguments can be made
for most corporations – the harms they inflict are not malicious but
collateral damage to the purpose for which they are created – the
maximisation of profit (Stephens, 2002). Legal principles operate to
enshrine this logic and indeed to protect investors and executives from
its consequences. The effect of this legally enshrined irresponsibility
has led Bakan (2004) to argue that corporations are externalizing
machines. Accounting practices privilege certain costs and benefits and
exclude others. Harms (like those to people and the environment) are
externalised by the corporation and there is accordingly no requirement
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to protect against them.

In their transgression of cherished categories and taxonomies
monsters are contaminated and contaminating, arousing horror – a
combination of fear and disgust (Carroll, 1987). However, despite
public acknowledgment and interrogation of massive harms caused by
corporations and cries of ‘never again’ – there is a failure to translate
this horror into action. We are left instead with a dull apathetic dread.
The damage corporations cause is well known and yet the criminal
legal system fails to respond in any meaningful way (Garrett, 2020,
2014). This dread may be more consistent with Cavarero’s conception
of horrorism as a state of paralysis, in which we become frozen with
repugnance and fear (Cavarero, 2010). The absence of any persuasive
coherent account of corporate responsibility is itself horrific and
paralysing. The problems are too big for us as individuals to solve. A
central insight of the horror genre is that monsters justify and require
extreme responses. It is not possible to just kill a vampire, it necessary
to put a stake through its heart. These measures are specific to the
monster type; for example, unlike vampires, zombies require their
brains to be destroyed. If the legal system continues to construct and
regard corporations as monstrous, incomprehensible and capable of
systemic harms, then the legal system can and should import the
insights of the horror genre and use extreme measures to resolve the
corporation. Rather than stopping at the argument that corporations
have no body to kick and ‘innocent’ shareholders may suffer if the
corporation is fined, we need to find more imaginative and specific
responses to corporate crime.20
Yet the measures required to take effective action may appear so
extreme as to be undesirable (Munger and Salsman, 2013). The idea
of ‘too big to fail’ connects monsters and corporations. For example,
in Aliens, Ripley suggests that they destroy an entire planet to make
sure that the alien is destroyed. This failure of the horror genre to
proffer any meaningful resolution of monsters may be because monsters
themselves are a corrupted metaphor. Monsters are creatures of the
imagination, they are particularly associated with the film industry,

85

Penny Crofts

and ‘good’ monsters are frequently an essential component of highly
profitable franchises that cannot be fully resolved because of the need
for a sequel (Nowell, 2014). Monsters, like corporations, are an integral
part of the capitalist environment. A quest to resolve corporate monsters
may result in harms beyond those inflicted upon the monster.

An alternative approach is to emphasize that a further characteristic
shared by monsters and corporations is that they are fictions –
corporations, like monsters, are creatures of our own making. Monsters
are created in the minds of writers and expressed in special effects and
animation. Likewise, a central trope in law is that corporations are a
legal fiction (Lind, 2015; Schane, 1987; Schauer, 2015). They only
exist through a creative act of the state (Hallis, 1930). This trope is
well rehearsed. As long ago as the seventeenth century Coke asserted
that the corporation is ‘invisible, immortal and rests only in intendment
and consideration of the law’ (Coke, 1612). Central to this emphasis
upon fiction is that of imagination. Rather than turning away in
disgust like Victor Frankenstein from the creature that we created, and
possibly in the process creating a monster, we should take responsibility
for our creation. Corporations, like monsters, can be rewritten and
reconceptualised. Although horror films often portray a deterministic,
teleological concept of monsters that are trapped within the logic of
a specific motive and an unchanging pattern of behaviour, evolution
is possible. For example, instead of a mindless quest for brains, the
zombie company Fillmore-Graves in iZombie manufactures synthetic
brains. Perhaps we can rewrite the genre of the corporation, expanding
its purpose beyond that of profit.21 Monsters not only break rules but
challenge them. Rather than seeking to destroy these threats, our
response to transgression can be positive. We can rewrite our systems
of meaning, develop new metaphors, and honour the abject. In films
such as Girl with all the Gifts, Shaun of the Dead, and Warm Bodies,
monsters are incorporated and included as part of new world order.
It may yet be possible to reimagine criminal legal doctrine, engaging
with corporations as legal subjects in their own right, rather than as
monstrous deformations of stereotypical forms.
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Endnotes
1

2

3

4

Doctor Penny Crofts is a Professor of the Faculty of Law, University
Technology Sydney. The research for this article was funded by an
Australian Research Council Grant: Rethinking Institutional Culpability:
Criminal Law, Philosophy and Horror (DE180100577).

Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward 17 US 518 (1819). The court
recognised the legitimacy of Dartmouth’s corporate charter, granted by the
British Crown before the US won its independence. The charter permitted
the college to purchase property and enter into contracts without requiring
natural persons to intervene. ‘Corporate personification was indirect and
merely served as an analogy to preserve property and contract interests.’
(Wright, 2015: 893). Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad Co
118 US at 369 (1886) included a headnote documenting the Court’s
unanimous stipulation that corporations are persons within the purview
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I am using the term ‘responsible human being’ in recognition that the
granting of legal personality is not automatic for human beings, but is,
like the corporate personality, constituted by law (Gindis, 2016; Vining,
1978), and one of the key questions for criminal law is whether a person has
the legally recognised capacity to be held responsible for their actions. For
example, the presumption of doli incapax is that children lack the moral and
intellectual development to have the capacity to be guilty of crime (Crofts,
2018). Theorists such as Grear (2015) have interrogated the paradigmatic
legal subject, arguing persuasively that the corporation may well be the
epitome of liberal legal personhood. Esposito (2012) has enunciated the
genealogy of personhood itself which disembeds the ‘human’ broadly as
the presupposed subject.

For a lovely analysis of early modernist conceptions of corporations, see
(Siraganian, 2020). Popular culture depictions of the corporation as
monster include: Depiction of corporation as monster - R.R. Anderson,
Corporate Personhood Must DIE!, CARTOON MOVEMENT (Jan.
4,2011), https://cartoonmovement.com/cartoon/corporate-personhoodmust-die; R.S. Janes, The Thing that Ate America, Our End of the Net
(Feb. 25, 2010), http://endofthenet.org/archives/5615; Brian McFadden,
The Strip: Mitt Romney Corporate Monster, N.Y. Times (Aug. 21, 2011),
https://cartoonmovement.com/cartoon/mitt-romney-corporations-arepeople. Newitz argues that monster stories are ‘one of the dominant
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5

6

7

8

9

allegorical narratives used to explore economic life in the United States’
(Newitz, 2006, p. 5).
E.g. the clean hands metaphor in equitable jurisdiction is a way to express in
concrete terms of daily human life the abstract legal reasoning about denial
of relief to a plaintiff whose own conduct has been improper. PERSON IS
PROPERTY metaphor in slavery (Williams, 1988). See also, (Bartlett,
1988; Foster 2006; Greenwood 2005; Hibbitts, 1994; Loughlan, 2006;
Solove, 2000; Tushnet, 1982; Winter, 1988, 1987).
Justice Louis Brandeis’ 1933 Supreme Court judgment cited Wormer’s
account of corporations as Frankenstein’s monsters. Louis K Liggett Co et
al v Less, Comptroller et al 288 US 517 (1933) 548, 567.

(Shelley, 1818). The comparison of corporations with Frankenstein’s
monster are apposite because Shelley was writing at the time of the
industrial revolution and the increasing use of joint-stock companies for
business enterprise. (Peters, 2017: 434).
In oral arguments in Citizen United v Federal Election Commission, Justice
Sotomayor remarked in Shelley-esque terms that the US Supreme Court
‘gave birth to corporations as a person, and … imbued a creature of State law
with human characteristics’. Citizens United v Federal Election Commission
130 S Ct 876 (2010).
These general principles have been adopted in Australia (see Hamilton v
Whitehead 166 CLR 121, 127). The UK has largely reaffirmed the directing
mind approach in AG’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] EWCA Crn 90. In
Bolton’s case, Lord Justice Denning compared the company to a human
body with a brain (the ‘directing mind’) and hands (the servants or agents):
H. L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd v T. J. Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB
159. The idea of finding the ‘brain’ of a corporation is based on the idea
that the brain is the control centre of a person. Tesco was constrained in
Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995]
2 AC 500 which effectively extended the class of person who might be
identified as the company by relaxing the strictness of the directing mind
and will test.

10 https://w w w.smh.com.au/politics/federal /thousands-of-zombief irms-set-to-march-into-september-reckoning-20200612-p5522b.
html. First applied in 1990s to Japanese firms that were propped up
by banks: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2002/nov/20/japan.
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internationalnews. Also extended to zombie capitalism: https://www.
ips-journal.eu/regions/global/article/show/zombie-capitalism-must-die4008/#:~:text=Zombie%20capitalism%20regularly%20becomes%20
rattled%20by%20financial%20crises,catapult%20their%20digital%20
platforms%20into%20profitable%20quasi%20.

11 Some films suggest that immediate amputation of an infected limb can
stop infection, but this is not consistent.

12 The film Land of the Dead (2005) does present the idea of the evolution of
zombies to enable collective action (Hughes, 2021).

13 It is also a source of lawyer jokes e.g. Question: What’s the difference
between a lawyer and a vampire? Answer: A vampire only sucks blood at
night.
14 See for example, The Passage, Twilight series, The Strain.

15 This was done very effectively by CommBank in the Banking Royal
Commission. For an analysis see Penny Crofts, 2020b.
16 Eg. Bram Stoker’s Dracula, Salem’s Lot, The Passage. There are exceptions
to the rule including in Twilight and True Blood. The Army of the Dead
(who are more reminiscent of zombies than vampires) in Game of Thrones
are resolved through the slaying of their leader.

17 Attractive zombies do exist but are rare. Examples include the series
iZombie and the romantic horror Warm Bodies.

18 (Christoff, 2014; Dan-Cohen, 2016; Gilbert, 2006; Robbins, 2016;
Whetten and Godfrey, 1998). For example, Australia has enshrined a
realist approach in its corporate culture provisions, which can attribute
mens rea to corporations based on their corporate culture.

19 (Cole, 2006). The ‘monsters’ in slasher horror are most likely to portray
pure malevolence, where they wish only to harm and there is little to no
explanation for why. Examples include the Halloween, Friday 13th and
Nightmare on Elm Street franchises. Even in these slasher horrors the
violence is tends to be explained as due to vengeance (Dika, 1990). For
classic monsters like vampires, we know that they need to drink blood to
survive, which is an example of instrumental evil rather than unexplained
malevolence.
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20 For some proposals on imaginative punishment for corporations see the
Australian Law Reform Commission, Corporate Criminal Responsibility:
Final Report (2020).

21 There is a significant debate occurring around rewriting or amending the
purpose of the corporation to enable more socially responsible corporations
or for stronger stake holding (Grantham 2021). See for example, https://
www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020-the-universalpurpose-of-a-company-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/.
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